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[Crim. No.10lli. In BaDk. July 7, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN RIVERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible ErrorAdmissions and Confessions. - The Escobedo-Dorado rules,
concerning the inadmissibility of statements obtained from an
accused without first advising him of his rights to counsel and
to remain silent, do not apply to reinstated appeals in cases
in which the judgment became final prior to June 22, 1964,
and in which appellant was denied counsel on appeal.(Disapproving, insofar ns they arc inconsistent, People v. Jaquisl.,
244 Cal.App.2d 444, 448 [53 Cal.Rptr. 123] ; People v. Boyden,
237 Cal.App.2d 695, 697 [47 Cal.Rptr. 136]; People v. Garner,
234 C~1.App.2d 212, 215, fn. 1 [44 Cal.Rptr. 217]; People v.
Benavidez,233 Cal.App.2d 303 [43 Cal.Rptr. 577].)
(2] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Voluntary Character-Review.When an accused's confession has been admitted in evidence
against him, even if the Escobed(l rule, concerning advice to
the accused of his rights to counsel and to remain silent
before obtaining the confession, does not apply to his case, as
a r~instated appeal, the rulcs of Escobedo and Miranda, concernirig advice of the right to the presence of counsel during
interrogation and thc presence of an assigned attorney if
defendant is indigent, must be taken into account on the issue
of whether the confession was voluntary.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions--Voluntary Character-Review:
Appeal-Presumptions-Evidence.-Although the Supreme
Court cannot presume from a silent record that proper warnings were given to an accused of his rights to remain silent
and to have the aid and presence of counsel during interrogation, a failure to warn, standing alone, does not suftice to
support a claim that defendant's statements were involuntary
where both defendant and the interrogating officer testified to __
the voluntariness of the statements.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Clarence Harden, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first
degree robbery affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 616.
MeR. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1381.1(2); [2]
Criminal Law, § 480(1); [3] Criminal Law, §§ 480(1), 1292.
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Allan L. Rudick, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and C. Anthony Collins, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.--John Rivers and two codefendants,
Benny Carter and Walter Robinson, were convicted in 1960 of
first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).1 Rivers alone
appealed. He abandoned the appeal after his application for
appointment of counsel on appeal was denied. The appeal was
dismissed in 1961. Pursuant to Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
853 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814], this court in 1965 directed
the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, to recall
the remittitur, vacate the order of dismissal, reinstate the
appeal, and appoint counsel for Rivers. The Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment of conviction. We ordered a hearing in
this court on our own motion to give further consideration to
the possible application of Escobedo v. IUinois (1964) 378
U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 8.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361].
On March 21, 1960, a San Diego food market was robbed.
An employee identified Rivers' car as the one he saw slowly
pass the market several times shortly before the robbery.
There were three men in the car. Three eyewitnesses identified
the two codefendants as the robbers who entered the store. A
police officer testified to a conversation he had with Rivers in
which Rivers made statements as follows: He denied his guilt
,but admitted that he drove his car, accompanied by the codefendants, to the market at the time of the robbery. The
codefendants discussed past ~nd future robberies on the way
to the market. He waited in the car while the codefendants
went into the market and returned. He saw both money and
guns in the codefendants' possession after the robbery. He
.admitted that he left hurriedly for Los Angeles at 2 :30 a.m.
when he heard that the police wished to question him about a
robbery.
Rivers' only contention on this appeal is that in the light
of Escobedo v. IllinO'is, supra, 378 U.S. 478, and People v.
Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338, the court erroneously admitted
lRobinson pleaded guilty to the offense. Rivers and Carter were jointly
, tried and found euiltT by a jury.
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the evidence of his statements to the police officer at his trial
in 1960.
In In re Lopez (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398
P.2d 380], we analyzed the interests involved in limiting the
retroactivity of the Escobedo-Dorado rules in much the same
way the United States Supreme Court did in its later resolution of similar problems. 2 Although we recognized that the
exclusionary rule of Escobedo" sought to eliminate conditions
which invited coerced confessions" (62 Ca1.2d at p. 372) we
concluded that the pre-existing rules were not so deficient as
to justify reopening final judgments. Drawing an analogy to
earlier state and lower federal court decisions on the retroactivity of the Fourth' Amendment exclusionary rule, we
concluded. that judgments that were final as of the date of
Escobedo (June 22, 1964) could not be attacked on the basis
of that, case. (See also In re Harris, 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [16
, Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305], concurring opinion.) Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court also adopted the finaljudgment-date rule to limit the retroactive effect of Jlapp v.
Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84
A.L.R.2d 933] (Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. 618),
and of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d
106,' 85 S.Ct. 1797]. (Tehan v. Shott, supra, 382 U.S.
406.)
Well over a year after our decision in Lopez, however, the
United. States Supreme Court held that Escobedo applied only
to those cases in which the trial commenced after the Escobedo decision. That court not only held that the' finaljudgment-date rule was not constitutionally compelled, but
intimated that the decision to invoke that rule in Linkletter
and Tehan, instead of a trial-date rule, was dictated by prior
actions the court had taken without full consideration and
discussion of the retroactivity issue. (Johnson v. New Jersey,
supra, 384 U.S. 719, 732.) It further stated, however, that
"States are still entirely free . . . to apply those standards
in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision." (Id. at p. 733.)
Lopez had given broader application to Escobedo than was
constitutionally compelled in the interim between Lopez and
2Compare the analysis 01. 1ft, re Lop~, 62 Cal.2d 368, 372·381 [42 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380], with that in Lifl.kletter v. Walker (1965) 381
U.S. 618, 636-640 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731]; Tehatn v. Shott (1&65)
382 U.S. 406, 413·419 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 s.et. 459]; JohnaOfl, v. New
Jersey ~1966) 384 U.S. 719, 726-732 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 B.Ot. 1772].
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Johnson. In People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Ca1.2d 681 [56
Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221], we reconsidered the effective
date for the application of Escobedo in light of the Johnson
decision and faced for the first time the issue of the effective
date for the application of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384
U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].
We chose to follow Johnson in applying Miranda only to
those cases in which the trial began after J nne 13, 1966. (65
Cal.2d at p. 687. ) We adhered to the rule of Lopez, however,
for the application of Escobedo.
There are persuasive reasons for preferring a finaljudgment-date rule to a trial date rule. S Although these
reasons were overcome by considerations relative to the application of Miranda, the application of Escobedo to cases 0))
direct appeal presented different considerations. Of primary
importance was the context in which we considered in 1966
the application of Escobedo. We did not face the issue for the
first time, and in weighing the potential effects of a departure
from our Lopez rule, we noted that "The vast majority of
cases in California which had not become final prior to .June
22, 1964, have by this time been disposed of on appeal in
accordance with the teaching of Escobedo and Domdo. Accordingly, we need not invite the anomalies and the manifest
injustice which the rejection of Lopez, at the virtual end of
its natural life, would entail." (People v. Rollins, supra, 6G
Cal.2d 681, 691.) "[W]e continue to follow Escobedo in the
few remaining cases which were pending on direct review
when that decision was announced." (ld. at p. 691, fn. 10.)
Cases that were final before Escobedo, but which must now
'See generally Mishkin, The 8upre'IM Oourt, 1964 Term-Foreword:
The High Oourt, the Great W1'it, and the Due Process 0/ Time and Law
(1965) 79 Harv.L.Rev. 56.
We have reasserted our preference for the final-judgment-date rule in
cases calling for limited retroactivity (People v. Charles (1967) ante,
pp. 330, 335-337 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545]), but, as evinced
by Rollins itself, we are not bound to a rigid formula when special
problems exist. See People v. Bandhauer (1967) ante, pp. 524, 530131 [58 Cal.Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 900], in which we adopted the Johnson
technique by applying a rule relating to the order of argument only to
cases tried after the announcement of the rule (People v. Hill (1967)
Gnte, pp. 536, 564, fn. 7 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908]).
The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed its commitment to a
flexible approach to problems of retroactivity to meet tlle "exigencies of
the situation" in adopting in Stovall v. Denno (June 12, 1967) 35 U.B.L.
Week 4610, 4611, a fourth alternative (right to counsel at lineups applicable only to confrontatiolls for identification purposes conducted after
Bt01XJll).
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be reconsidered on appeal, do not arise under the "natural
life" of Lopez. Thcy constitute a separate category of cases
that threaten to be of significant quantity, and they present
considerations different from those in Lopez and are not
governed by the rationale of Rollins. This new category of
cases was 'spawned by the disapproval of California's procedure for determining when counsel should be appointed to
represent indigent defendants on appeal. (Douglas v. California, supra, 372 U.S. 353; see also Swenson v. Bosler (1967)
386 U.S. 258 [18 L.Ed.2d 33, 87 S. Ct. ' 996] ; Anders v. California .(1967) 386 U.S. 258 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 8.Ct.
1396].) Under Douglas, defendants whose convictions were
final years ago, having exhausted all routes of appeal, are
today afforded the assistance of counsel on appeal in all cases
in which it was previously denied. We directed the recall of
the remittitur and the reinstatement of the appeal in this case --'-.
for the sole purpose of affording equality in representation
between defendants denied counsel on appeal and defendants
who had counsel. (372 U.S. at pp. 355-358.) To ~pply Escobedo at a reinstated appeal and to review police conduct that
occurred years before that decision would not promote equality. To the contrary, "the indigent defendant deprived of
counSel anomalously would find himself possessed of more
shafts in his quiver than would have been the case had he
been able to afford to properly arm himself in the first
instance." (People v. Garner (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 212,
215, fn.l [44 Cal.Rptr. 217].)
Insofar as the additional shaft provided by Escobedo is
primarily prophylactic, it is directed at controlling future
police conduct, not conduct that was long ago completed and
that was then lawful. Retroactive application of Escobedo,
regardless of the finality of the judgments of conviction or the
voluntariness of the defendants' statements would create the
very harms we sought to foreclose in Lopez. It "would result
in the reconsideration of countless cases that were correctly
decided under the law in force at the time of trial; in many
such cases witnesses and evidence would no longer be available. Many hardened and dangerous criminals would glean the
greatest profit from [such a rule]; they serve lengthy sentences imposed long ago; their cases thus offer the least likelihood of successful retrial. To require a general release of
prisoners of undoubted guilt would be to cripple the orderly
administration of the criminal laws." (In re Lopez, supra, 62
Cal.2d at p. 381.)
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The serious disruption of the administration of the criminal
law that would be caused by retrials and by the denial of the
use of statements received in full compliance with the law
compels adherence to the rationale of In re Lopez. [1] 'Ve
therefore hold that the Escobedo-Dorado rules do not apply to
reinstated appeals such as this one. Cases in which it has be(lll
held or assumed that those rules apply to reinstated appeals
are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with the
views expressed herein (e.g., People v. Jaquish (1966) 244
Cal.App.2d 444, 448 [53 Cal.Rptr. 123]; People Y. Boyden
(1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 695, 697 [47 Cal.Rptr. 136] ; People v.
Garner (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 212,215, fn. 1 [44 Cal.Hptr.
217]; People v. Benavidez (1965) 233 CaI.App.2d 303 [43
Cal.Rptr. 577]).
[2] Defendant correctly contends that even if Escobedo
does not apply to his case, the rules of Escobedo and lIf1'randa
must nevertheless be taken into account on the issue of voluntariness. (Clewis v. Texas (1967) 386 U.s. 707, 709 [18
L.Ed.2d 423, 426, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 1339] ; Johnson v. New
Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719, 730.) [3] Both defendant and
the interrogating officer testified to the voluntariness of the
statements, and there is nothing in the record to support
defendant's contention of involuntariness other than an
absence of evidence that he was properiy warned. Although
we cannot presume from a silent record that proper warnings
were given (Miranda v. Arizona, sup"a, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476,
498-499; People v. Stewart (1965) 62 Cal.2d 571, 580-581 [43
Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]), a failure to warn standing alone
is not sufficient to support defendant's contention that the
statements were involuntary (Davis v. North Carolina (1966)
384 U.S. 737, 740 [16 L.Ed.2d 895, 86 8.Ct. 1761] ; Pembrook
v. Wilson (1966) 370 F.2d 37,39).
The judgment is affirmed.
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan
J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-J dissent.
When appellate courts :fix different dates for the operative
effect of their decisions in criminal cases involving the same
constitutional rights, confusion is bound to result. The instant
case adds to that confusion by creating another unnecessary
e:xception to an established rule.
Until relatively recently it was an established doctrine that
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decisions recognizing the existence of constitutional rights
were retroactive in the full sense of that word. (Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 8.Ct. 792, 93
A.L.R.2d 733] ; II amilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 [7 L.Ed.2d
114, 82 8.Ct. 157]; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [9
L.Ed.2d 81i, 83 8.Ct. 814].) Then this court and the Supreme
Court of the United Stc'ltes discovered the device of making
such decisions partially retroactive so as to apply only to
cases not reduced to final judgment when the rules were
announced. (In re Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398
P.2d 380] ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 [14 L.Ed.2d
601, 85 8.Ct. 1731] ; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 [15 L.Ed.2d
453, 86 8.Ct. 459].) Then, apparently impressed with this
newly discovered power, the United States Supreme Court in
Johns011 v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86
8.Ct. 1772], held that the rules announced in Miranda v . .Ari•.
zona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 8.Ct. 1602, 10
A.LR .. 3d 974], should apply only to cases tried after the date
of Miranda. We followed this decision (People v. Rollins, 65 .
Cal.2d 681 [56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221]). Then, just a
few weeks ago, the high court went all out and held that the
lineup rule, based on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights,' should apply only where the illegal lineup was held
after June 12, 1967, the date of its decision. (Stovall v.
Denno, 35 V.S.L. Week 4610.)
In the instant case, the majority opinion adds a new rule to
this already overcrowded field of confusion. It first reaffirms
the rule announced in Lopez, that the rules of Escobedo and
Dorado apply to all cases not yet final when those cases were
decided, but then holds that the "finality" there referred to
does not apply where the lack of finality is caused by recalling
the remittitur. In other words, the majority hold that when a
remittitur is recalled, and the judgment set aside because the
appellant never had the appeal guaranteed him, and is
afforded for the first time a proper appeal, the law in effect
when the abortive appeal was decided governs. In other
words, we must treat the appeal as if a final judgment had
been rendered before the date of Escobedo even though we
know 110 such final judgment exists because the remittitur has
been recalled!
To accomplish this result the majority find it necessary to
disapprove four recent cases. (People v. Jaquish, 244 Cal.
App.2d 444 [53 Cal.Rptr. 123]; People v. Boyden, 237 Cal.
App.2d 695 [47 Ca1.Rptr. 136J; People v. Garner, 234
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Cal.App.2d 212 [44 Cal.Rptr. 217] ; People v. Benavidez, 233
CaI.App.2d 303 [43 Cal.Rptr. 577].) In these four cases, this
court, in denying hearings after decision by the Court of
Appeal, had established the rule that where a remittitur was
recalled and the second appeal was heard after Escobedo,
Escobedo applied.
In each of these four cases this court passed upon the
precise legal point involved here, and then determined, for
apparently convincing reasons, that Escobedo applied after
the remittiturs were recalled. Such a well settled rule should
not be disturbed except for the most compelling reasons. No
convincing reasons are offered by the majority.
The majority opinion is also contrary to the fundamental
theory announced by this court in In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d
740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P .2d 948]. That case held that the
law in effect when the appeal is decided, even where the new
rule is statutory, governs, and not the law when the act was
committed or the case tried. The majority in the instant case
by some undisclosed nunc pro tunc process apply the law in
effect when the abortive appeal was considered. This is inconsistent and contrary to In re Estrada, supra.
But of even greater importance the majority completely
disregard, in fact do not even mention, the law applicable to
the recall of a remittitur. It must be remembered that the
remittitur was recalled here because appellant never had a
valid appeal-he never had the appeal guaranteed to him,
that is an appeal with counsel. The appeal without counsel
was abortive and was set aside. The first' legal appeal that
Rivers has had is the instant one.
The very effect of recalling the remittitur is to set aside the
"final" judgment. The so-called "final" judgment disappears from the case, and the appeal is in the same position as
if no appeal had been idecided. The theory is that when an
appellate court recalls its remittitur it does not "resume" a
jurisdiction it has lost, but, because of the facts requiring the
recall, it has never lost jurisdiction-that the judgment
recalled is a nullity and should be disregarded. (Isenberg v.
Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 725 [7 P.2d 1006]; Trumpler v.
Trumpler, 123 Cal. 248, 252 [55 P. 1008].) These principles
are disregarded in the majority opinion.
There are other factors to be considered. Had Rivers had
counsel on his first appeal it is conceivable counsel could have
raised the very point later decided in Escobedo. The majority
deny him that right. Moreover, had the appeal of Rivers been
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delayed until after Escobedo was decided, he would, of course,
have been entitled to the benefits of that decision under In re
Lopez, supra, 62 Ca1.2d 368. These possibilities suggest a
denial of equal protection in the instant case.
Once it !s conceded that Rivers is entitled to raise the Escobedo point, there can be no doubt that he was interrogated in
violation of the rules of that case, and that such violation was
prejudicial. At the very least, during his improper interrogation he made damaging admissions. One statemeni amounted
to a confession. This interrogation clearly violated the prejudicial error rule established by Fahy v. Connecticut, 378 U.S.
85 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229], and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].
In Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, at page 86, the rule is stated
to be that an error is prejudicial unless it can be said that
there is· no "reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." In
Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, the Fahy case
is specifically reaffirmed and the rule restated as "before a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. "
Once· error is established, these rules require a reversal
unlesn the appellate court affirmatively finds that there is no
"reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction." In the present case there
is more than "reasonable possibility" that the error may
have" contributed to the conviction." Certainly it cannot be
said that "beyond a reasonable doubt" the error was harmless. That being so the error must be held prejudicial and
therefore reversible.
The fact that Rivers took the stand at his trial and repeated
some but not all of the admissions did not immunize the error.
Obviously, there is at least a "reasonable possibility" that he
took the stand because he had already made the admissions
which had been erroneously admitted. (People v. Spencer,
lJ.nte, p. 158 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715].)
I would reverse the judgment for the reasons stated.

